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DISPARATE IMPACT, DISCRIMINATION, AND
THE ESSENTIALLY CONTESTED CONCEPT OF
EQUALITY
George Rutherglen*
[T]he line between discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is
not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the
Court's opinion might assume.I
In this single sentence, Justice John Paul Stevens suggests all of the
problems with the uneasy distinction between disparate impact and
discriminatory purpose under the Constitution and the civil rights laws.
Both theories of liability rely upon the same evidence. Yet each theory
purports to establish unique standards of liability, disparate impact more
favorably for plaintiffs and discriminatory purpose more favorably for
defendants. This observation, offered almost in passing by Justice Stevens,
in fact raises profound issues about the goals and methods of civil rights
law-what it seeks to achieve and how it goes about achieving it. The
uncertain fault line between disparate impact and discriminatory purpose
cuts through almost all the major issues in this field, with implications for
subjects as different as affirmative action, racist and sexist stereotyping, and
the distinctive features of age discrimination, an issue most recently
addressed by Justice Stevens's opinion in Smith v. City of Jackson.2
The distinction between disparate impact and discriminatory intent raises
so many issues because it marks the boundary between consensus and
controversy over the concept of equality in civil rights law. This is the
point at which litigation, argument, and judicial decisions depart from
widely shared understandings about what laws against discrimination
prohibit and turn to intensely fought disputes over what those laws seek to
achieve. Adapting terminology from the philosophical literature,3 at this
point the overlapping consensus on discrimination gives way to the
essentially contested concept of equality. The theory of disparate impact
* John Barbee Minor Distinguished Professor of Law, Edward F. Howrey Research
Professor, University of Virginia. Law Clerk to Justices William 0. Douglas and John Paul
Stevens, October Term 1975. I would like to thank the participants at the Conference on the
Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens and at a workshop at the University of Virginia School of
Law for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 254 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
2. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
3. John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, in Collected Papers 421
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 Proc. of the
Aristotelian Soc'y 167 (1956).
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thus plays two very different roles in civil rights law. At the concrete level
of administering the law, it allocates the burden of proof between plaintiffs
and defendants. At the abstract level of defining the ultimate aims of the
law, it structures debates over equality.
This Article discusses these different dimensions of the theory of
disparate impact, beginning in Part I with a survey of the areas in which
claims of disparate impact appear and the efforts to distinguish such claims
from those of intentional discrimination. Part II traces the vicissitudes in
the theory of disparate impact back to the breakdown in consensus over
what constitutes prohibited discrimination and to arguments over the
inherently contested concept of equality. Part III returns to an examination
of legal doctrine and the most recent decision under the theory of disparate
impact, Justice Stevens's opinion in Smith v. City of Jackson, recognizing a
version of the theory under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
I. VARIETY AND AMBIGUITY IN THE THEORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT
The theory of disparate impact acquired its first firm foothold in civil
rights law in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,4 the leading case recognizing the
theory as a basis for liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 5 From there, the theory fitfully spread to other statutory claims,
sometimes through judicial decisions, at other times by statute. As
Washington v. Davis famously (or, for some, infamously) held, the theory
does not apply to claims of discrimination under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments, which instead require proof of discriminatory intent. 6 A
strictly chronological account of these developments would reveal a very
checkered history, with decisions to adopt or reject liability for disparate
impact soon followed by qualifications and limitations. The unifying theme
in all of these developments is that the theory of disparate impact raises not
one issue, but two: first, whether to recognize liability on this basis,
effectively shifting part of the plaintiff's burden of proving discrimination
onto the defendant to prove absence of discrimination; and second, how
much of this burden is shifted to the defendant and in what terms. Both
inquiries depend heavily on context so that, for instance, the labor market
analysis appropriate for cases under Title VII has no relevance whatsoever
to the analysis of voting patterns for cases under the Voting Rights Act.
Justice Stevens's opinion in Smith v. City of Jackson, recognizing a limited
form of liability for disparate impact under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, perfectly illustrates these points.7 To appreciate the
significance of this decision, it is first necessary to survey the overall
development of the theory.
4. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
6. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976).
7. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-46.
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Griggs, as mentioned earlier, is the starting point for this development. It
was a purely statutory case, concerned with a private employer and claims
only under Title VII. Constitutional issues figured, at most, only
tangentially in the case, which concerned testing and education
requirements for higher-level jobs at a utility plant in North Carolina.8 The
landmark holding in the case was that "practices, procedures, or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices." 9 If the opinion clearly relieved the plaintiff of the
burden of proving intentional discrimination, it left open exactly what the
plaintiff had to prove to establish disparate impact or what the defendant
had to prove to justify a practice with such impact. The plaintiffs burden
was met in that case by only the most cursory statistical evidence and the
defendant's burden was alternatively framed in a variety of different ways:
as a showing of "business necessity," or that the disputed practice was
"related to job performance," or that it had "a demonstrable relationship to
successful performance," or that it had "a manifest relationship to the
employment in question." 10 These ambiguities determined the structure for
development of the theory of disparate impact under Title VII, even if they
have not been fully resolved to this day.
Griggs was soon followed by decisions that expanded liability for
disparate impact, mainly by emphasizing phrases such as "business
necessity" or "manifest relationship to the employment in question," which
apparently placed a heavier burden of proof upon the defendant. This stage
in the development of the theory quickly reached its high-water mark in
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,II a decision followed by the issuance of the
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. 12 These guidelines
consisted of regulations issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") and the other federal agencies charged with
enforcing Title VII. Although the guidelines explicitly governed only the
exercise of enforcement discretion, they were given "great deference" by
the courts, following similar deference given to earlier versions of these
regulations by the EEOC in Griggs and Albemarle Paper.13 Like those
decisions, the guidelines concentrated on what the defendant had to show to
justify a practice with disparate impact, rather than what the plaintiff had to
show to prove disparate impact in the first place. The latter issue was left
mainly as proof of something less than intentional discrimination. Thus the
early trend under the theory of disparate impact was to enhance the
8. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26.
9. Id. at 430.
10. Id. at 431-32.
11. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
12. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2005).
13. Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 425-36; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433-34. Later decisions,
however, took a much less deferential approach to the guidelines. Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440, 450 (1982); N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.31 (1979);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250-52 (1976).
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defendant's burden of proof and minimize the plaintiffs, resulting in
decisions that expanded the scope and significance of the theory.
This expansion was halted by the decision in Washington v. Davis,
which, in addition to holding that the Constitution prohibited only
intentional discrimination, imposed further restrictions on claims for
disparate impact under a statute, applicable only to the District of
Columbia, that was assumed to incorporate the same standards for liability
as Title VII.14 Other decisions also imposed indirect restraints on claims of
disparate impact under Title VII, by tightening the limits on the use of
statistical evidence to prove discrimination 15 and by strictly interpreting the
requirements for certification of class actions, which served as the
procedural vehicle for bringing most claims of disparate impact. 16 One
decision, concerning discrimination against methadone users, also
commented on the insufficiency of the evidence of disparate impact. 17 In
other respects, however, the theory of disparate impact was modestly
expanded, by reaching claims of sex discrimination 18 and by giving the
plaintiff the option of attacking a defendant's employment practices one by
one, rather than as a whole. 19 A further expansion of the theory occurred in
a decision that applied it to subjective hiring and promotion decisions, in
addition to the objective tests and educational requirements at issue in
Griggs.20
This last decision, however, signaled a much more restrictive turn in the
decisions under Title VII. In this case, the Court divided evenly over a
significant retrenchment in the theory, so that no binding precedent was
created, but the view adopted by a plurality of four became the opinion of
the Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.21 That decision increased
the plaintiffs burden of proof by requiring identification of a specific
employment practice with disparate impact, and placing the burden of
persuasion entirely upon the plaintiff. In contrast, the defendant's burden of
proof was greatly reduced, only to a burden of production and only to a
justification that survived "a reasoned review" by the court.22
The twists and turns of the case law under Title VII could be explored in
further detail, but Congress has had the last word (so far, at least) on the
theory of disparate impact under Title VII. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
superseded, and to a large extent, overruled Wards Cove. The holdings on
14. Washington v. Davis also involved a claim under § 1981. Such claims were later
held, however, to require proof of intentional discrimination. See infra text accompanying
notes 44-45.
15. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977).
16. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982); E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys.,
Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1977).
17. See Beazer, 440 U.S. at 593-94.
18. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977).
19. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453-54 (1982).
20. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
21. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
22. Id. at 659.
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the defendant's burden of proof were specifically rejected, and only the
requirement that the plaintiff identify a specific employment practice, when
it was possible to do so, was endorsed by Congress. 23 Title VII now
provides that the defendant has both the burden of production and
persuasion to establish that an employment practice with disparate impact is
"job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity. '24 Exactly what this phrase means is unclear, and indeed,
systematically ambiguous, since it embraces both poles of interpretation of
the defendant's burden: business necessity and job relationship. Nor does
the congressional command to look to decisions before Wards Cove25
resolve this ambiguity, since those decisions, as we have just seen, are also
ambiguous.
Regardless of what the Civil Rights Act of 1991 actually accomplished, it
transformed the theory of disparate impact from a matter of judicial
interpretation to one of legislative codification. The same process also
marks the development of the effects test for violations of the Voting Rights
Act, the analogue to claims of disparate impact under Title VII. In City of
Mobile v. Bolden,26 the Court held that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 27
prohibited only intentional discrimination, 28 but this decision, like Wards
Cove, was soon overruled by Congress in the 1982 amendments to the Act.
These added a new subsection 2(b) that established an effects test to
determine whether voting rights had been denied on the basis of race.29
Like the amendments to Title VII, this amendment was justified as a return
to preexisting law, mainly in decisions under the Fifteenth Amendment,30
and the end result again was that Congress was clearer about what it
rejected than what it accepted. It rejected any requirement that the plaintiff
prove intent, but it adopted an open-ended test "based on the totality of the
23. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 703(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000). The Act also
sought to revise the burden of proof on the issue of pretext, but it was not clear precisely
how it changed preexisting law. Compare id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (requiring that pretext be
determined according to the law before Wards Cove), with Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 436 (1975) (stating that pretext can be proved by showing that other selection
devices without disparate impact could also serve the employer's interests).
24. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 703(k)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
25. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 3(2), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).
26. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000). The then-current version of this section was enacted in 79
Stat. 437 (1965).
28. City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 60-61 (plurality opinion of Stewart, J.). Justice Byron
White would also have required proof of intent, but he dissented on the ground that such
intent had been established in this case. Id. at 103 (White, J., dissenting).
29. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2000)). City of Mobile v. Bolden was specifically
disapproved in the legislative history. S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 2 (1982).
30. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th
Cir. 1973).
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circumstances," which was further elaborated by a variety of factors
identified in the legislative history. 31
The source of these ambiguities all derive from the same concern that
Justice Stevens expressed in Washington v. Davis: the problematic
distinction between discriminatory intent and discriminatory effects.
Justice Stevens expressed exactly the same concern in his separate opinion
in City of Mobile v. Bolden. Although he concurred in the judgment in that
case, agreeing with the majority that the plaintiffs had no claim, he believed
that "a proper test should focus on the objective effects of the political
decision rather than the subjective motivation of the decisionmaker." 32
Nevertheless, a simple finding of disparate impact on some racial group
was, in his view, insufficient to establish a violation of section 2.33 The
1982 amendments take a similar position by requiring an examination of a
variety of different factors, of which disparate impact on a particular racial
group is only one. As refined in Thornburg v. Gingles,34 for claims of vote
dilution through the use of multimember districts, these factors require a
showing that "a bloc voting majority must usually be able to defeat
candidates supported by a politically cohesive, geographically insular
minority group." 35 This showing involves more than the loss of a single
election or even a pattern of elections by candidates from a minority group;
it also requires elements of racially selective bloc voting.36
This trend, away from rigid insistence on proof of intentional
discrimination toward some form of liability for discriminatory effects, is
evident under other civil rights statutes. More so than under Title VII and
the Voting Rights Act, claims of disparate impact under these statutes have
been of limited significance. Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 37 a companion provision to Title VII that prohibits racial
discrimination by recipients of federal funds, the Supreme Court has
recognized a limited form of liability for disparate impact. Such claims can
be brought, not under the statute itself, but only under regulations issued
under the statute, 38 and these claims can be brought only by the
government, not by private individuals. 39 Claims of disparate impact can
31. S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 27-30; see Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44-46 (1986).
32. City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring). He made the same point in
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 642-50 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33. City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring).
34. 478 U.S. at 30.
35. Id. at 49.
36. See id
37. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (2000).
38. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 584 n.2, 591-92 (1983)
(plurality opinion); id. at 623 n.15 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 643-45 (Stevens J., joined
by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,
281-82 (2001).
39. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 293. Curiously, however, some claims for discrimination on
the basis of sex under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-
1685 (2000), involve a strong version of the theory of disparate impact. Even though Title
IX is modeled on Title VI, it has been interpreted through regulations and judicial decisions
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also be brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,40 another statute that
prohibits discrimination by recipients of federal funds, in this case on the
basis of disability. When this prohibition was extended generally to
employers by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 41 the
theory of disparate impact was also codified, in terms that closely resemble
those that now appear in Title VII. 42 Nevertheless, few class actions are
brought under the employment provisions of the ADA because of the
predominance of individual issues, such as the nature and extent of a
plaintiffs disability and the cost of accommodations. 43 Individual claims
under the ADA have eclipsed claims of disparate impact.
Two statutes originally enacted during Reconstruction-§ 1981 and
§ 1982-generally prohibit racial discrimination in contracting and real
estate transactions. 44 Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in all
forms of contracting, whether public or private, but it has been interpreted
by the Supreme Court to prohibit only intentional discrimination. 45 Section
1982 is more narrowly focused on discrimination with respect to property
transactions, but because its history is so closely linked with § 1981, it, too,
has been limited to intentional discrimination. 46 Modem fair housing
legislation has received more equivocal interpretations, with the circuits
split on the availability of claims for disparate impact under the Fair
Housing Act of 1968.4 7 So, too, the decisions under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act of 197448 have left the standards for proving
discrimination in lending uncertain, with courts seeking various analogies
to cases under both Title VII and the Constitution. 49
All of these statutory developments culminated in Smith v. City of
Jackson, in which the Supreme Court recognized a qualified form of the
theory of disparate impact under the Age Discrimination in Employment
to require allocation of athletic opportunities in intercollegiate college sports in a form
proportional to overall enrollment. See 34 C.F.R. § 106 (2005); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101
F.3d 155, 174-77 (1st Cir. 1996).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000); Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 298 (1985).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (2000).
42. Id. § 12112(b)(6).
43. The few disparate impact claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA") that are likely to be successful concern denial of access to government services or
public accommodations under Titles II and II1, rather than claims for employment
discrimination under Title I. See Sunrise Dev., Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 62 F. Supp. 2d
762, 776-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (concluding that zoning restrictions on assisted living facilities
were likely to have a disparate impact on disabled individuals).
44. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (2000). These statutes were originally part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
45. Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1982).
46. See id. at 388 (interpreting both § 1981 and § 1982 to require proof of intentional
discrimination).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000); see Peter E. Mahoney, The End(s) of Disparate
Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending Law, and the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 47 Emory L.J. 409, 425 n.54 (1998).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2000).
49. Mahoney, supra note 47, at 411, 447-50.
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Act of 1967.50 This decision, to be discussed more fully in Part III, requires
a prior understanding of the place of age discrimination in the entire
spectrum of civil rights claims, including those under the Constitution. It is
therefore useful to return to Washington v. Davis and its requirement that
the plaintiff prove intentional discrimination in order to establish a violation
of the Constitution. Some scholars found this decision to be a significant
retreat from the promise of equal racial justice in Brown v. Board of
Education.51 Others, like my colleague, Dan Ortiz, found it to be an
invitation to exploit the ambiguities in the concept of intent and to tailor the
standards for proof of intentional discrimination to different contexts. 52
These views are not mutually exclusive and elements of both must surely be
true: Ambiguities in the concept of intentional discrimination tend to be
systematically resolved in favor of a narrow interpretation of the
Constitution. The same general conclusion can be approached through two
related, but distinct, issues: first, the evidence necessary to prove
intentional discrimination; and second, the relationship between intentional
discrimination and affirmative action.
Concrete issues of proof, more than any abstract theory, reveal the
fundamental similarity between claims of intentional discrimination and
those of disparate impact. The evidence submitted to prove one kind of
claim invariably can be used to support the other. Four decisions within a
few years of Washington v. Davis illustrate this point, two under the
Constitution and two under Title VII. In Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., the disparate impact of a zoning
decision on African-Americans was held to be insufficient to establish
discriminatory intent in the absence of further evidence showing that race
entered into the decision-making process. 53 The Court acknowledged,
however, that evidence of adverse impact "may provide an important
starting point" and may be entirely sufficient if "a clear pattern,
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the
state action." 54 The history of decision making on the issue in question-
zoning for single-family dwellings-also was relevant and was found to be
a sufficiently neutral justification for the city's refusal to rezone to permit
low-income housing. 55 These two elements in the Court's analysis figure in
virtually all claims of discrimination: the plaintiffs initial showing of
discriminatory intent or effects and the defendant's offered justification for
the disputed decision.
50. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1544-46 (2005).
51, 394 U.S. 294 (1955). For an example of one such scholar, see David A. Strauss,
Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935 (1989).
52. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1105
(1989).
53. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
54. Id. at 266.
55. Id. at 268.
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A more problematic decision, Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,56
illustrates the inherent ambiguity in the definition of "intent," as well as the
relevance of the justification offered for allegedly discriminatory practices.
The Court there upheld a veterans' preference for state employment that
worked overwhelmingly to the advantage of men, with less than two
percent of women eligible for the preference. 57 Although the proportion of
women in the armed forces has undoubtedly increased since that time, the
Court relied on the troubling assertion that the adverse effect of the
preference on women was only foreseeable, not intentional. 58 This fine
distinction between different mental states, even if it can be applied to
individuals, simply does not fit the reality of the organizational decision
making of the legislature that enacted the preference. As Justice Stevens
said in his opinion in Washington v. Davis, "A law conscripting clerics
should not be invalidated because an atheist voted for it."' 59 A far better
justification for the decision in Feeney rests on a closer analysis of the
burden, rather than the benefit, imposed on members of both sexes by the
veterans' preference. It worked to the disadvantage of a large proportion of
men, in addition to women. 60 While not persuasive in and of itself, since so
few women benefited from the preference, the significant burden imposed
upon men added support to the justification offered for the statute:
rewarding veterans for their service to the nation. And, indeed, under Title
VII veterans' preferences are entirely exempt from claims of
discrimination.61 Analyzed in terms of the burden of proof, the defendants
invoked a state interest, analogous to a business justification, sufficient to
justify a practice with a substantial adverse effect on both sexes. What was
crucial, on this view, was not the defendants' subjective intent, but the
objective evidence of the effect of the preference and the justification
offered for it.
Two decisions under Title VII, both concerning claims of intentional
discrimination, followed essentially the same pattern of looking to objective
evidence. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, the
Court upheld a finding of intentional discrimination in hiring and promoting
truck drivers to better-paid positions as "over the road" drivers.62 The
plaintiffs evidence was overwhelming, establishing an "inexorable zero,"
as the Court of Appeals said, of almost no representation of minority drivers
in "over the road" jobs. 63 This stark statistical disparity was augmented by
anecdotal evidence of intentional discrimination against individual truck
drivers that, in the Court's words, "brought the cold numbers convincingly
56. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
57. Id. at 270.
58. Id. at 279.
59. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
60. Justice Stevens pointed this out in a separate opinion. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 281
(Stevens, J., concurring).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-11 (2000).
62. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 375-76 (1977).
63. Id. at 342 n.23.
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to life."'64 Such an extreme case, although fortunately no longer typical, is
as easy as it is rare.
More representative of cases today is Hazelwood School District v.
United States,65 which involved a claim of intentional discrimination
against a government employer. This claim was brought under Title VII,
but it could equally well have been brought under the Constitution.66 By
the same token, the Court's careful analysis of the statistical evidence could
be applied equally to both kinds of claims. What is surprising is that it also
could be applied to claims of disparate impact. The same examination of
the labor market, in this case for positions as public school teachers, and of
the employer's hiring decisions over the relevant time period, and the same
determination of the significance of any discrepancy in those numbers,
applies equally to the plaintiff's burden to show disparate impact as to show
intentional discrimination. Indeed, in the decades since Hazelwood was
decided, the only reliable difference between the use of statistical evidence
in the one case and in the other is that a greater discrepancy, supported by
additional evidence, is needed to show intentional discrimination. 67
The similarity between the two kinds of claims goes further. AsJustice
Stevens pointed out in his dissent, if the plaintiff succeeded in making out a
prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifted to the defendant
to rebut that case.68 The majority did not disagree with this analysis, 69
although neither opinion identified discrete issues on which the burden of
proof was allocated between the parties. Instead, the dispute in Hazelwood
was entirely over the adequacy of the plaintiffs statistical evidence, an
issue on which the plaintiff had the entire burden of proof, even on a claim
of disparate impact. Supposing, however, that the defendant had submitted
evidence to justify its hiring practices-for instance, conducting interviews
in order to assure that teachers had the necessary personal skills to work
effectively with students and other faculty-that evidence could have been
used in rebuttal. Evidence of job relationship or business necessity,
available as a defense to claims of disparate impact, can also be used to
defeat a claim of intentional discrimination. The difference between the
two theories of liability is not in the evidence used to support or defeat a
claim of discrimination, but in the way in which the burden of proof is
explicitly allocated between the parties under the theory of disparate
impact.
All of this bears out Justice Stevens's observation that the difference
between discriminatory intent and discriminatory effects is not as great as it
appears to be. It leaves open the puzzle, however, about why the difference
64. Id. at 339.
65. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
66. Id. at 306 n.12.
67. At least, that is the only difference I have been able to find. See George Rutherglen,
Disparate Impact Under Title VII. An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 Va. L. Rev.
1297, 1332 (1987).
68. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 314 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 309-10.
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between these theories of liability has been so frequently litigated. If only a
subtle shift in the burden of proof is at stake, why do the parties care so
much about this issue? Why, for that matter, has the Court devoted so
much attention to it, as well as Congress, in specifically defining the
difference between claims of disparate impact and claims of intentional
discrimination under Title VII? The next part of this Article addresses
these questions.
II. DISCRIMINATION AND THE INHERENTLY CONTESTED CONCEPT OF
EQUALITY
For lawyers, disputes over the theory of disparate impact are disputes
over the burden of proof. As an initial matter, disputes over whether the
theory is available at all reduce to the question of whether the plaintiff has
to carry the entire burden of proving intentional discrimination or only the
lesser burden of proving disparate impact. And if the theory is recognized,
most disputes over its implementation turn on how much of the burden of
proof is shifted onto the defendant-whether the defendant has a lighter or
heavier burden of justifying a practice with disparate impact. Lawyers care
about the burden of proof because, in close cases, it determines who wins or
loses, with doubts resolved against the party who bears the burden. The
party who does not have the burden of proof can blame all the gaps in the
evidence and in the resulting inferences on the party who does. Placing the
burden of proof on the opposing party often gives lawyers a decisive edge
in litigation.
Yet the obsession of lawyers with the burden of proof, understandable
though it may be, does not explain its pervasive presence in the law of
discrimination, particularly as it bears upon claims of disparate impact.
This obsession is attributable, or so I will argue, to deeper issues, values,
and concerns. My thesis is that disputes over the theory of disparate impact
mark the point where the consensus over discrimination runs out and the
inherently contested concept of equality takes over. As with several other
related issues, notably affirmative action, controversies break out where
prohibitions against discrimination no longer provide a reliable and
accepted guide about how to achieve equality. Disputes about equality then
feed back into disputes over what constitutes prohibited discrimination,
narrowing the prohibition in some respects and extending it in others, but
giving rise to controversy precisely because of these distortions of the
concept of discrimination itself.
Borrowing from the philosopher John Rawls, we might say that we have
an "overlapping consensus" on the concept of discrimination. 70 For Rawls,
the overlapping consensus is a condition that assures the stability of
70. Rawls, supra note 3, at 421. For a similar adaptation of Rawls's views, but one
more focused on a normative analysis of abstract issues rather than a descriptive account of
concrete disagreements, see Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108
Harv. L. Rev. 1733 (1995).
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principles of justice in a well-ordered society.71  It assures that these
principles, derived by arguments that appeal to rational individuals in a
hypothetical situation, would prove to be minimally acceptable to people
with diverse moral and religious beliefs in the realistic conditions of a
modem democratic society. The overlapping consensus, in his view, is not
a compromise that somehow represents the weighted average of otherwise
inconsistent beliefs. It represents a commitment that adherents of those
beliefs, to the extent they are reasonable, would have to principles of
justice. Rawls derives these principles by entirely different means,
dependent upon elaborate arguments made within what he calls "the
original position." 72 The overlapping consensus only assures that, if the
principles of justice derived in the original position were actually adopted in
any modem society, reasonable people with fundamentally different moral
and religious views would find them acceptable as a basis for social
cooperation. The overlapping consensus neither provides the arguments for
his principles of justice nor eliminates controversy over what those
principles are. It only explains how, once adopted, they would form the
basis for a stable political order.73
To pursue the subtleties of Rawls's theory of justice would take a
separate article, far removed from the intricacies of the theory of disparate
impact. But that, in a way, is the point. No theory of justice explains the
law as we have it. No comprehensive theory of equality uniquely
determines the legal prohibitions against discrimination. Instead, altogether
too many theories of what equality truly requires can be invoked to support
the minimal concept of discrimination as colorblindness. And altogether
too many disputes among those theories reflect disagreements about how
that concept should be extended, modified, or limited. The overlapping
consensus, as Rawls uses the term, only provides a means for describing the
problematic relationship between comprehensive moral and religious views
and the more limited concept of political liberalism that he endorses. It
insulates his theory of justice from more fundamental disputes between
adherents of different religions and secular philosophies of life.
The same basic idea, however, can be invoked at a lower level of
abstraction and generality to describe the relationship between theories of
justice and equality, and actual legal rules. In the realm of civil rights, it
describes the point at which the concept of discrimination gives way to
arguments over equality; where arguments about the best means of
preventing improperly motivated actions, whether by government or by
employers, gives way to arguments about the kinds of equality the law is
71. Rawls, supra note 3, at 422-23.
72. Id. at 428. For Rawls's account of the original position, see John Rawls, A Theory
of Justice 102-30 (rev. ed. 1999).
73. Rawls, supra note 3, at 444. Rawls distinguishes the overlapping consensus from a
"modus vivendi" based only on a contingent confluence of opposed interests. The
overlapping consensus, by contrast, is based on values in the different comprehensive views
held by members of society. Id. at 421-23.
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seeking to achieve, in terms of equal opportunity throughout society. Such
disputes break out over the definition and application of the concept of
discrimination itself, as cases like Personnel Administrator v. Feeney
illustrate. The more abstractly discrimination is defined, as it is in Title VII
in a provision that requires proof that "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, '74 the easier it
is to reach agreement on it. When it is applied in any concrete case,
disagreements are likely to break out, and when it is extended to entirely
different issues, like affirmative action, disagreement overwhelms
consensus. In the debates over affirmative action, the fault line between
discrimination and equality occurs just at the point that race-conscious
programs can no longer be justified as remedies for identifiable instances of
past discrimination. Broad agreement across the political spectrum
supports the concept of discrimination as colorblindness. It gives way to
fundamental controversy when that principle must be violated in order to
attain some broader concept of equality, defined in terms independent of
discrimination itself
The support for the concept of discrimination as deviations from
colorblindness is so broad partly because the concept itself is defined in
redundant, yet ambiguous terms, such as "intentional discrimination." The
widespread use of this phrase, without much sense that it is redundant,
reveals the problem. Discrimination, in the usual meaning of the term,
outside of civil rights law, requires some form of intent with respect to the
grounds of discrimination. A manager cannot discriminate between skilled
and unskilled, or qualified and unqualified, workers without taking these
characteristics into account. So, too, he or she cannot discriminate on the
basis of race or sex without taking these factors into account. Concepts
such as "unconscious discrimination" 75 and "discriminatory effects" are
extensions of the concept of discrimination in the ordinary sense and have
elicited controversy for just this reason. Some critics, of course, have
questioned these extensions, but it is more important to contrast them with
the accepted sense of discrimination. Across the political spectrum, from
right to left, there is agreement about the need to prohibit discrimination in
its most narrowly defined and widely accepted sense: as adverse action
taken against members of minority groups and against women simply
because of their status as members of these groups.
Thus, Richard Epstein, who is usually a reliable indicator of the extreme
right wing of acceptable political opinion, endorses a prohibition against
discrimination by government, and to the extent necessary to dismantle the
effects of such discrimination, discrimination by private employers as
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). This provision continues, "even though other
factors also motivated the practice." Id.
75. Charles Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987); see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995).
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well. 76 To be sure, from his book, Forbidden Grounds, it is sometimes
difficult to tell whether he objects to discrimination by the government
more because it is by the government than because it is discrimination.
Nevertheless, he does oppose it, sometimes based on libertarian arguments
for restricting the role of government and sometimes based on utilitarian
arguments for promoting overall efficiency. 77
Representative of a more moderate conservatism is Alexander Bickel,
who clearly stated his position in his well-known denunciation of
affirmative action. As he said before the first affirmative action cases were
decided,
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson
of contemporary history have been the same for at least a generation:
discrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional,
inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society. Now this is to
be unlearned and we are told that this is not a matter of fundamental
principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored.78
This famous passage promotes the principle against discrimination into a
constraint on any form of legitimate government action-a surprisingly
absolutist position for Bickel to take given his otherwise general allegiance
to the pragmatic, conservative approach he adopted from Edmund Burke,
with his sensitivity to the history and circumstances in which government
must act.
79
Another constitutional scholar, John Hart Ely, offered an equally famous
defense of affirmative action, confronting Bickel directly with the argument
that it did, indeed, make all the difference whose ox was gored: the
minority's or the majority's.80 He saw no constitutional objection to the
majority discriminating against itself through programs of affirmative
action. 8 1 The majority could protect itself through the political process by
means that were not available to minority groups. His position was based
explicitly on rights of democratic participation: not simply to have each
individual's vote counted equally with every other, but to have each
individual's interest considered equally in the entire process of government.
Still further along the spectrum of liberal views, many scholars have
defended prohibitions against discrimination as a means, but only one
means, of "break[ing] down old patterns of racial segregation and
hierarchy," to use the phrase from United Steelworkers v. Weber,82 the
major decision upholding affirmative action under Title VII. This defense
of affirmative action as a remedy for the persistent consequences of past
76. See Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds 103-15 (1992).
77. Id. at 118-25.
78. Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 133 (1975).
79. Id. at 3, 16-17.
80. See generally John Hart Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination,
41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1974).
81. See id. at 727.
82. 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
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discrimination has been widely embraced, by figures otherwise so diverse
in their philosophical commitments as Lawrence Tribe, Cass Sunstein,
Ronald Dworkin, Owen Fiss, and David Strauss.83 It attaches priority to the
end of achieving effective equality over the means chosen to achieve that
end. Prohibitions against discrimination are only one such means to this
end.
At the left-wing extreme, partisans of Critical Legal Studies, Critical
Race Theory, and Critical Feminists denounce any attempt to make
prohibitions against discrimination the exclusive means of remedying
inequality, not on the ground simply that they are ineffective, but on the
ground that they legitimate the status quo of caste, oppression, and
disadvantage. Alan Freeman, Charles Lawrence, Richard Delgado, Lani
Guinier, and Catharine MacKinnon have criticized prohibitions against
discrimination as the embodiment of a purely formal principle of equality
that fails to take account of the reality of race- and sex-based
subordination. 84 This deficiency in existing law can be cured only by
recognizing the rights of groups to achieve equal status and recognition. As
I read these authors, however, they have stopped far short of advocating
repeal of the laws against discrimination, like Title VII. Their criticism
essentially is that existing law does not go far enough, not that it goes too
far.
This commitment, however qualified and nuanced, to prohibitions
against discrimination represents the common ground among legal theorists
across the political spectrum. It constitutes the overlapping consensus,
reached by theoretical arguments from very different, if not utterly
incompatible, premises, and proceeding by equally varied and divergent
methods of reasoning. This consensus is not only a matter of theory, but
expresses the widespread support for prohibitions against discrimination, as
revealed by polling data on affirmative action. These data show that
approval rates for affirmative action depend very heavily on how programs
of affirmative action are described. The term itself elicits widespread
disapproval, as do decisions based on preferences rather than ability, while
programs to improve the position of minorities or to compensate for past
83. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 226-27 (1978); Laurence H. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law 1514-21 (2d ed. 1988); Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair
Employment Laws, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 235, 310-13 (1971); David A. Strauss, The Myth of
Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. Ct. Rev. 99, 100, 126-27; Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 873, 896-97 (1987).
84. See Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority 3-5 (1994); Catherine MacKinnon,
Towards a Feminist Theory of the State 161-66 (1989); Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561, 568-77
(1984); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Racial Double Helix: Watson, Crick, and
Brown v. Board of Education (Our No-Bell Prize Award Speech), 47 How. L.J. 473, 484
(2004); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L. Rev.
1049, 1050 (1978); Lawrence, supra note 75, at 387-88 (1987).
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discrimination receive broader support.85 The common thread in all the
data is that discrimination is the baseline from which both approval and
disapproval is derived: approval if affirmative action is seen to be
necessary to remedy past discrimination; disapproval if it is thought to be
only an instance of continued discrimination. Prohibitions against
discrimination are the common ground on which disputes over affirmative
action are fought out.
Allegiance to the concept of discrimination as an abstract ideal is nearly
universal. Disputes break out only when it is necessary to formulate
concrete rules for actually achieving equality. As my colleague, Dan Ortiz,
has pointed out, these disputes arise even over the terms in which
prohibitions against intentional discrimination are applied, varying across a
range of different claims from employment discrimination to voting
rights.86 The variation is all the more striking, and the disagreements more
intense, over claims of disparate impact. On the hopeful side, the absence
of hard-and-fast rules of liability allows claims of disparate impact to be
molded to different forms of discrimination and the different contexts in
which they arise. This is, I believe, one of the central insights of Justice
Stevens's opinion in Smith v. City of Jackson, to be discussed more fully in
the next part of this Article.
On the doubtful side, the same variability creates the risk that the
commitment to equality embodied in laws against discrimination will not be
fully implemented, and that technicalities and qualifications in applying the
theory of disparate impact will defeat the efforts of most plaintiffs to
establish liability. The overlapping consensus on prohibiting intentional
discrimination results, on this view, from the effectiveness of such
prohibitions in remedying yesterday's problems of explicit segregation and
exclusion that characterized the regime of Jim Crow and that was largely
dismantled by the first wave of civil rights litigation in the decades after
Brown v. Board of Education.87 No matter how effective in eliminating
such obvious forms of discrimination, prohibitions against intentional
discrimination could not address the more subtle forms of discrimination
that grew up in their place. The theory of disparate impact initially played
an important role in "smoking out" these hidden forms of discrimination,
but its effectiveness was compromised, on this pessimistic view, by
procedural and substantive restrictions imposed on plaintiffs who brought
claims under this theory.
Much can be said for this conclusion and much has been said for the
optimistic view as well. For present purposes, it is less important to choose
between these views than to recognize the way in which they define and
structure debate over the theory of disparate impact. It plainly extends
85. Charlotte Steeh & Maria Krysan, The Polls Trends: Affirmative Action and the
Public, 1970-1995, 60 Pub. Opinion Q. 128, 130-31 (1996).
86. Ortiz, supra note 52.
87. See, e.g., David Lyons, Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of
Slavery and Jim Crow, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 1375, 1389-91 (2004).
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liability beyond claims for intentional discrimination, but does so subject to
the same concerns and restrictions. These views attempt to strike a balance
between pragmatic effectiveness in eliminating discrimination and
preserving quintessentially American values of individual rights, universal
coverage, and limited government. Prohibitions against intentional
discrimination preserve these values, first, by protecting individuals from
discrimination on the basis of features that they, by and large, are powerless
to change. Second, these prohibitions are universal in the sense that they
protect everyone, as we say, regardless of race, color, creed, or sex. Whites
are protected as well as blacks, men as well as women. And third, these
prohibitions require only limited government intervention, telling
employers, government, and other institutional actors only what they may
not consider in making decisions, not what they must consider.
This compromise does not work so easily for claims of disparate impact.
To the extent that such claims uncover subtle or hidden forms of
discrimination, no one denies their desirability. Eliminating discrimination
is the core commitment of the overlapping consensus on civil rights. But
the countervailing values of individualism, universality, and limited
government qualify and restrict efforts to make good on this commitment.
The theory of disparate impact threatens to compromise these values for
many of the same reasons as programs of affirmative action. Like
affirmative action, the theory of disparate impact emphasizes results over
intent, focusing on group statistics instead of individualized evidence of
discrimination. Likewise, this theory of liability works almost exclusively
to the benefit of minority groups and women. 88 Claims of disparate impact
are virtually never brought on behalf of whites or on behalf of men. Lastly,
such claims require defendants to justify practices with disparate impact,
injecting courts into a reassessment of the defendant's reasons for adopting
the practice in the first place.89 Courts end up telling defendants what they
should do, not just what they should not do.
The connection between disparate impact and affirmative action also
operates at the practical, in addition to the theoretical, level. Defendants
faced with liability for disparate impact have powerful incentives to adopt
affirmative action plans to alleviate the adverse effects of practices that they
would otherwise have to justify with more or less extensive empirical
evidence. As Judge John Wisdom first articulated the problem under Title
VII, employers faced with liability for disparate impact, without the
possibility of engaging in permissible forms of affirmative action, would be
placed on a "high tightrope without a net beneath them." 90 They would be
subject to suit either for disparate impact or for reverse discrimination.
Allowing them to adopt affirmative action programs for hiring, training, or
88. Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by
White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1505, 1508-09 (2004).
89. Rutherglen, supra note 67, at 1298.
90. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977)
(Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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promotions, even if they do so in the shadow of the law, allows them to
reduce their exposure to liability.
But here, too, countervailing values have limited the force of legal
doctrine. The threat of liability for disparate impact, at least under Title
VII, has never required employers to eliminate all forms of imbalance in
their workforce. Liability has actually been imposed usually only when
there is some reason to believe that the employer has engaged in intentional
discrimination: where there is a complete absence or only minimal
presence of members of a minority group--"the inexorable zero" as it has
been characterized-or where the practice in dispute is inherently suspect,
either because it has been previously found to be illegal or because it was
framed in terms that obviously exclude members of the plaintiff's class,
such as ostensibly neutral height and weight requirements that nevertheless
exclude a large proportion of women. Liability for disparate impact under
Title VII, whatever the hopes of its advocates, 91 has never strayed very far
from liability for intentional discrimination. Claims of disparate impact,
although doctrinally distinct from claims of intentional discrimination,
remain bound by the same limiting principles embedded in the overlapping
consensus.
These theoretical considerations do not resolve the tensions inherent in
the theory of disparate impact. They instead explain why the tensions exist
in the first place and why they have persisted from the decision in
Washington v. Davis, almost thirty years ago, to the decision in Smith v.
City of Jackson, from just last Term. The next part takes up the
development of the theory of disparate impact in that case.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR AGE DISCRIMINATION
In his opinion in Smith v. City of Jackson, Justice Stevens announced the
judgment of the Court recognizing claims of disparate impact under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), but he also narrowly
interpreted the reach of such claims. His opinion, effectively for a majority
of the Court, might appear to be a compromise between the competing
arguments for and against interpreting the ADEA in exactly the same terms
as Title VII. The two statutes have some provisions in common and some,
directly relevant to the theory of disparate impact, that diverge. To view the
decision from such a strictly doctrinal perspective, however, is greatly to
underestimate its importance. It demonstrates the Court's continuing
commitment to imposing liability for discriminatory effects as a means of
preventing hidden and otherwise elusive forms of discrimination.
The plaintiffs in City of Jackson were police officers who claimed that a
pay raise for all city employees was systematically less favorable to officers
over the age of forty than to younger employees. 92 They did not claim that
91. See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round
Three, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 494, 551-52 (2003).
92. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1539 (2005).
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they received lower raises in absolute terms, but only that they received
lower raises as a proportion of their preexisting salary.93 The limited form
of adverse impact that they alleged no doubt reduced the ultimate
persuasiveness of their claim that they were victims of discrimination, as
did the justification offered by the city for the way the raises were
structured. Employees with less than five years experience, who were
predominantly under forty, received proportionally greater raises based on
preexisting salary because the city was trying to bring starting salaries up to
the regional average.94 These background facts did not support a strong
inference that the city acted generally contrary to the interest of older
workers, but instead that it adopted a policy for entirely legitimate reasons
that inevitably was less favorable to some employees than others. There
was little evidence in the record that the city was engaged in some form of
subtle discrimination against older workers.
It therefore comes as no surprise that the plaintiffs ultimately lost this
case. 95 What is surprising is that the Court went out of its way to allow
them to state a claim under the theory of disparate impact. Justice Stevens,
for a plurality of four justices, held that the ADEA itself supported claims
of disparate impact, 96 and he was joined in this conclusion by Justice
Antonin Scalia, who reached the same conclusion by deferring to EEOC
regulations recognizing the theory of disparate impact.97 Unlike Justice
Stevens, who also cited these regulations in his opinion, 98 Justice Scalia
would have deferred to them as a reasonable interpretation of the statute
under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.99
Justice Scalia's reliance on EEOC regulations raises significant issues of its
own, given the EEOC's consistently more expansive view of the theory of
disparate impact than the Court's, 100 but the common ground between his
opinion and Justice Stevens's is more important than the differences. Both
would make claims of disparate impact generally available to plaintiffs
under the ADEA, without any restriction like those applicable to claims
against recipients of federal funds under Title VI.101
The doctrinal reasons for this conclusion derive directly from the
incorporation in the ADEA of language from Title VII that originally
93. Id. at 1545-46.
94. Id. at 1546.
95. And, indeed, all the Justices concurred in this conclusion (except Chief Justice
Rehnquist, who did not participate), differing only on the grounds on which the plaintiffs
lost. See id.; id. at 1549 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at
1560 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
96. Id at 1544.
97. Id. at 1546-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
98. Id at 1544.
99. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
100. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607
(2005); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328-33 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975); Rutherglen, supra note 67, at 1316.
101. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
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supported the decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 10 2  The main
prohibitions in each statute are identical, with only the substitution of age in
the ADEA for the grounds of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. As
Justice Stevens emphasized in his opinion, "Griggs, which interpreted the
identical text at issue here, thus strongly suggests that a disparate impact
theory should be cognizable under the ADEA."' 10 3  In her opinion
concurring in the judgment, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor rejected this
reasoning and refused to recognize any form of liability for disparate impact
under the ADEA, relying on two respects in which the text of the ADEA
departed from Title VII: first, the existence of a defense based on
"reasonable factors other than age" ("RFOA") that has no counterpart in
Title VII; and second, the absence in the ADEA of any provision codifying
the theory of disparate impact, as is now present in Title VII. 104 This latter
objection implicitly appeals to the comparative history of Title VII and the
ADEA. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, although it amended both statutes,
codified the theory of disparate impact only under Title VII. Justice
Stevens deflected these textual objections by reconceiving them as
arguments addressed to the scope, rather than the existence, of liability for
disparate impact under the ADEA. 105
Both objections had been raised in the lower courts and in the secondary
literature, but the implications of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 had received
by far the most attention. 10 6 The RFOA has always been something of a
puzzle since it was plainly designed to benefit employers by giving them a
defense based on reasonably justified business decisions, but its relationship
102. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)-(c) (2000), with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)-(c) (2000).
103. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1542 (Stevens, J.).
104. Id. at 1551-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor had earlier raised doubts about the availability of the theory of disparate impact
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") in her opinion for the Court in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
105. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45 (Stevens, J.).
106. See Jennifer J. Clemons & Richard A. Bales, ADEA Disparate Impact in the Sixth
Circuit, 27 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2000); Kenneth R. Davis, Age Discrimination and
Disparate Impact, 70 Brooklyn L. Rev. 361, 383 (2004); Howard Eglit, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts
and a Dog that Didn't Bark, 39 Wayne L. Rev. 1093, 1102-05 (1993) [hereinafter Three
Acts]; Mack A. Player, Title VII Impact Analysis Applied to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Is a Transplant Appropriate?, 14 U. Tol. L. Rev. 1261 (1983); Nathan E.
Holmes, Comment, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: Are Disparate
Impact Claims Available?, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 299, 327 (2000); Toni J. Querry, Note, A Rose
by Any Other Name No Longer Smells as Sweet: Disparate Treatment Discrimination and
the Age Proxy Doctrine After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 530 (1996);
Jonas Saunders, Note, Age Discrimination: Disparate Impact Under the ADEA After Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins: Arguments in Favor, 73 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 591, 604 (1996). To
the extent that these articles discuss the reasonable factors other than age ("RFOA"), they do
so only incidentally as part of a larger argument against recognizing the theory of disparate
impact under the ADEA. The only article devoted to the RFOA itself is Howard Eglit, The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act 's Forgotten Affirmative Defense: The Reasonable
Factors Other Than Age Exception, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 155 (1986) [hereinafter Age
Discrimination].
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to the law as it developed under Title VII dissipated much of this
advantage. Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,107 employers could
defend most Title VII cases by articulating a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason" for a disputed decision. This defense, as the Supreme Court
emphasized in a number of cases, placed on employers the lightest of
burdens, only a burden of production and only to offer a plausible reason
for the disputed decision.' 0 8 The RFOA provision in the ADEA, by
contrast, seemed to force on employers a full-fledged defense, in which
they bore the full burden of proof, including the burden of persuasion, a
burden they conspicuously did not bear under Title VII. 109 Hence, the
RFOA was largely neglected in cases under the ADEA for two
incompatible but widely accepted reasons: either because it was redundant,
or because it was inconsistent with the allocation of the burden of proof
under McDonnell Douglas. This decision, unlike the RFOA, quickly came
to dominate the litigation of most claims of intentional discrimination,
regardless of the statute under which they were brought.lI°
The codification of the theory of disparate impact in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, by contrast, had direct and negative implications for the ADEA.
The Act codified the theory only under Title VII, superseding the Supreme
Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, which had
significantly restricted liability for disparate impact. 11 In the absence of
any corresponding amendment to the ADEA, the implication was that the
theory of disparate impact lacked the same secure footing in the literal
terms of the statute that it now had under Title VII. Moreover, the Act
amended the ADEA in other respects so that Congress could not have
meant simply to neglect the ADEA entirely. 112
Justice Stevens finessed both of these objections to the theory of
disparate impact under the ADEA by adapting them to the unique features
of age discrimination. In his view, the RFOA constituted recognition by
Congress that, at some point, most workers suffer a decline in productivity
with advancing age.113 The RFOA allows employers to act on this
107. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
108. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-55 (1981); Bd. of
Trs. v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
577-80 (1978).
109. See Age Discrimination, supra note 106, at 158-60.
110. The Supreme Court has only assumed that the structure of proof from McDonnell
Douglas applies to claims under the ADEA. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 141-42 (2000); O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 309-
11 (1996). Yet the lower courts have unanimously concluded that McDonnell Douglas also
applies to claims of intentional discrimination under the ADEA. See, e.g., Mooney v.
Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1995); Mack A. Player, Proof of
Disparate Treatment Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on a
Title VII Theme, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 621 (1983).
111. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see supra notes 21-22 and
accompanying text.
112. Three Acts, supra note 106, at 1102-05.
113. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1545 (2005).
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generalization by relying on neutral requirements, despite their disparate
impact on older workers. Employers bore a correspondingly lower burden
to justify practices with adverse impact on the basis of age. This
interpretation of the statute dovetailed with the negative implications of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which superseded Wards Cove but only for claims
under Title VII, leaving it applicable to claims under the ADEA.114 Justice
Stevens accordingly concluded that the best view of the entire statute, going
back to the central prohibitions adopted from the original version of Title
VII, supported the theory of disparate impact, but in limited form. 115
Beneath these purely textual issues was a fundamental question of policy:
the extent to which age discrimination should be treated like discrimination
on other grounds. The genesis of the ADEA, in a report ordered by
Congress when it enacted Title VII, supports the conclusion that
discrimination on the basis of age, if not quite as severe as discrimination
on the basis of race or sex, nevertheless is comparable. 16 Opposed to this
inference is the recognition in provisions like the RFOA that age eventually
takes its toll on most people's ability to hold a job. In its decisions on the
constitutionality of age discrimination, the Supreme Court has emphasized
the same basic point, that advancing age does not identify a discrete and
insular minority, but "a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our
normal span." 117  Those decisions do not undermine the congressional
judgment about the severity of employment discrimination on the basis of
age, a matter which rests well within its power to regulate commerce. It
does, however, implicate the way in which this problem must be addressed.
As Congress itself acknowledged in provisions like the RFOA, age cannot
be treated exactly on the model of race or sex. In his opinion in City of
Jackson, Justice Stevens succeeds in giving definite form to this ambiguous
congressional judgment: that age discrimination must be effectively
prohibited, but not necessarily on the same terms as discrimination on other
grounds. ' 18
Justice Scalia's reliance exclusively on regulations of the EEOC does not
resolve this problem, partly because the existing regulations do not strike
the balance demanded by the statute. As Justice O'Connor pointed out,
Justice Scalia's deference to the regulations is only partial. 119 While the
regulations recognize the theory of disparate impact, they also construe it to
allow employers only a defense of "business necessity," which is a far more
demanding standard than that imposed by Wards Cove. 120 Under the latter
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1545-46.
116. Report of the Secretary of Labor, The Older American Worker-Age Discrimination
in Employment 22 (1965), reprinted in U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n,
Legislative History of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1981).
117. Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (per curiam).
118. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-45.
119. Id. at 1559-60 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
120. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2005), with Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
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decision, as applied to the ADEA by Justice Stevens (and inferentially by
Justice Scalia, who joined in this part of his opinion), 121 the employer's
burden is only to produce evidence that "a challenged practice serves, in a
significant way, [its] legitimate employment goals."'122 Justice O'Connor
found the regulations to be limited to the EEOC's exercise of enforcement
authority rather than its interpretation of the law, 123 but this objection is
undermined by the agency's unequivocal recognition of liability for
disparate impact. 124
The real obstacle to giving the regulations Chevron deference has to do
with the origins of the theory of disparate impact under Title VII, which
was through judicial interpretation of the statute. 125  To be sure, the
EEOC's rulemaking authority is far more limited under Title VII than it is
under the ADEA, 126 but recognizing liability for discriminatory effects does
not easily fall within the ADEA's grant of authority to issue "such rules and
regulations as it may consider necessary or appropriate for carrying out this
chapter."'127 The same provision continues, in far more explicit terms, to
authorize "reasonable exemptions" to the other provisions of the ADEA.128
If the ADEA itself prohibited only intentional discrimination, as Justice
Scalia supposes, it is difficult to believe that a new cause of action of
disparate impact would be "necessary or appropriate for carrying out 129
this prohibition. It would, instead, be a completely new prohibition
inconsistent with the limited liability imposed by the statute. Indeed, to the
extent that the regulations allow only a defense of "business necessity,"
they are inconsistent with the statute as construed in Smith v. City of
Jackson and therefore entitled to no deference at all. 130
All the difficult questions about the theory of disparate impact arise from
its uneasy relationship to intentional discrimination. On the one hand, it is
different from intentional discrimination in expanding the scope of
defendants' liability, but on the other, it serves the same basic goal of
eliminating inequalities in employment. Working out the tensions in this
relationship cannot easily be left to an administrative agency, especially one
like the EEOC, which generally has taken positions favorable to
121. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1544-46; id. at 1546 (Scalia, J., concurring and
concurring in the judgment).
122. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
123. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1558-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
124. The regulation states that practices with a disparate impact "can only be justified as a
business necessity." 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d).
125. See supra notes 8-22 and accompanying text.
126. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (2000) (limiting the EEOC to "procedural
regulations" under Title VII), with 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000) (authorizing the EEOC to create
"reasonable exemptions" to the ADEA).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 628.
128. Id.
129. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1546 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(quoting Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 628).
130. See Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
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plaintiffs. 131 The history of the EEOC's regulations under Title VII reveal
a willingness to elaborate upon and to increase the defendant's burden of
justifying practices with disparate impact, and a corresponding reluctance of
the Supreme Court to consistently defer to them. This is not to say that the
EEOC's regulations should or do receive no deference under Title VII, but
it is the weaker deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 132 not the stronger
deference under Chevron that they should receive. The institutional
dynamics established under that statute cannot be displaced by an uncertain
delegation of rulemaking authority in the ADEA. 133  The degree of
deference given by Justice Stevens to these regulations more closely
follows the pattern established under Title VII.
It also more accurately conveys what is at stake with the theory of
disparate impact: how far our country is willing to go to assure the
effectiveness of prohibitions against discrimination, while at the same time
preserving the competing values that make those prohibitions attractive.
The critics of Washington v. Davis have pointed out the inadequacy of
relying exclusively on a prohibition only against intentional
discrimination. 134  Limiting the Constitution to claims of intentional
discrimination invites exactly the kind of evasion and under-enforcement
that permits many forms of discrimination to go undiscovered and
unpunished. 135 As a corollary, it also makes the concept of intent so central
to civil rights litigation that it is distorted beyond all recognition.' 36 By
contrast, the theory of disparate impact gives greater prominence to
objective evidence of discrimination, based on the actual effects of
employment practices rather than the employer's elusive state of mind, and
it makes the balance between effective enforcement and government
intervention explicit. 137
These objections to relying exclusively on prohibitions against
intentional discrimination are all the stronger with respect to statutory
131. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
132. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
133. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill &
Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116
Harv. L. Rev. 467, 576-92 (2002).
134. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values
in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1473 (2004) (arguing that
equal protection jurisprudence reflects a commitment to anticlassification, rather than
antisubordination); Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 San Diego
L. Rev. 1163, 1165 (1978) (arguing that intent requirements place a near-impossible burden
on the plaintiff because improper motives are easy to hide and result from a combination of
several different motives and actors). See generally Symposium, The Origins and Fate of
Antisubordination Theory: A Symposium on Owen Fiss's "Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause" Issues in Legal Scholarship (2002), http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/.
135. Siegel, supra note 134; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1218-20 (1978).
136. Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1065, 1069-73 (1998);
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric,
86 Geo. L.J. 279 (1997); Strauss, supra note 51, at 971-75.
137. See Strauss, supra note 51, at 960-62, 1012-14.
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prohibitions, like the ADEA, that pose no risk of judicial supremacy over
the legislature. As the development of the theory of disparate impact under
Title VII and the Voting Rights Act reveals, both the courts and the
legislature can adapt and refine the theory as it applies to different forms of
discrimination. In the stronger version of the theory, applicable to race,
sex, and national origin under Title VII, it encourages various forms of
affirmative action on these grounds. In the weaker version under the
ADEA, it does not play this role, but the more modest one of preventing
hidden forms of discrimination. Encouraging affirmative action is not even
thought to be necessary under the ADEA. Affirmative action for older
workers is neither prevalent, nor where it occurs, controversial, since it
remains entirely outside the statute's prohibitions. 138  Advocates of a
stronger version of the theory of disparate impact, applicable to all forms of
discrimination, need to take account of the widely varying context in which
the theory has been invoked. It is difficult to conclude, for instance, that
racial or sexual stereotypes have such a strong resemblance to stereotypes
on the basis of age that all these forms of discrimination need to be
addressed by exactly the same legal doctrine.
Adapting the theory of disparate impact to discrimination on different
grounds and in different situations constitutes a more promising strategy for
effective enforcement than insisting that all claims under this theory must
be treated alike. Respect for civil rights depends upon a recognition by the
majority that discrimination against a shifting constellation of minorities
works to the disadvantage of all. Just as in other areas of law, voluntary
compliance, instead of litigation, must be the ultimate aim in framing and
enforcing legal rules. Theories of liability that extend too broadly, without
an appreciation by those who must comply of how and why they should do
so, threaten enforcement of the law as much as liability that is too narrowly
constricted. The correct balance between over- and under-enforcement
cannot be struck in the abstract, but depends upon a pragmatic assessment
of what can be expected to work in different circumstances. Justice
Stevens's opinion in City of Jackson represents an attempt to strike such a
balance.
CONCLUSION
Another of Justice Stevens's former law clerks, Professor James
Liebman, observed some time ago that he was surprised to learn that over
the course of the Justice's career, he moved from the center to the liberal
wing of the court without changing position at all. Perhaps this is a sign of
the times, but it is also a sign of Justice Stevens's consistency and integrity.
He has not formulated artificially precise rules in one case only to depart
from them in the next. Where he has changed his mind, he has still adhered
138. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004). Legislative
programs, such as Social Security and Medicare, specifically for the benefit of older
individuals, likewise raise no constitutional questions of discrimination on the basis of age.
20061 2337
2338 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
to principles that were capable of developing with the changing nature of
discrimination. Nowhere is this more evident than in his opinions on the
theory of disparate impact, where he has sought to frame standards that
actually work to prevent discrimination and to encourage compliance with
the law. The methods of a judicial moderate, emphasizing pragmatic
respect for pluralistic values, inevitably disappoint those who argue for
clearer solutions to more simply framed problems. To his great credit,
Justice Stevens has recognized that the enduring dilemmas of
discrimination in our country do not yield to such measures. His opinions
on disparate impact are just one of many instances in which he has molded
legal principles to be an effective expression of our deepest values.
